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TAX VS. PENALTY, ROUND TWO: 
INTERPRETING THE ACA’S ASSESSABLE 
PAYMENT AS A TAX FOR FEDERAL AWARD 
COST ALLOWANCES 
Abstract: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA)—a significant 
health care reform enacted in 2010—imposes an “assessable payment” on certain 
employers that fail to offer affordable health insurance to their employees. Unfor-
tunately, this assessable payment label presents a problem for nonprofits and oth-
er nonfederal entities receiving federal awards. Per uniform guidance from the 
Office of Management and Budget, federal awards may be used to pay taxes, but 
not fines or penalties. This Note argues that the ACA’s assessable payment 
should be interpreted as a tax. This conclusion is based on both: (1) the U.S. Su-
preme Court’s analysis in its 2012 decision in National Federation of Independ-
ent Business v. Sebelius in which it held that the ACA’s individual mandate’s 
“shared responsibility payment” could, for constitutional purposes, be interpreted 
as a tax; and (2) an analysis of an assessable payment’s characteristics and likely 
effect on employer behavior. Interpreting the assessable payment as a tax recog-
nizes its inherent functionality as such and ensures that Congress does not escape 
political accountability for imposing taxes by using ambiguous terminology to 
describe an exaction. 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 23, 2010, President Barack Obama signed into law the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA).1 Representing a massive overhaul 
of the U.S. health care market, the ACA seeks to lower skyrocketing national 
                                                                                                                           
 1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 21, 25, 26, 29, and 42 U.S.C.), amended by Healthcare and 
Education Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029 (2010). Because President 
Obama made the health care reform accomplished by the ACA a major part of his political agenda, 
both critics and supporters of the ACA sometimes refer to it as “ObamaCare.” See, e.g., Editorial, 
Embracing His Inner ‘Obamacare,’ N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 2011, at A18, available at http://www.
nytimes.com/2011/10/08/opinion/the-president-embraces-obamacare.html, archived at http://perma.
cc/J9XG-8BRV (discussing the Republican Party’s “sneering dismissal” of the ACA); Julian Pecquet, 
President Embraces ObamaCare Label, HEALTHWATCH: THE HILL’S HEALTHCARE BLOG (Oct. 06, 
2011, 5:00 AM), http://www.thehill.com/blogs/healthwatch/health-reform-implementation/185877-
president-embraces-obamacare-label, archived at http://perma.cc/9WNH-QUZD (stating that Presi-
dent Obama embraced the term “ObamaCare” to turn the tables on critics who use the term derogato-
rily). 
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health care spending and, relatedly, to facilitate near-universal health insurance 
coverage.2 The primary way that the ACA seeks to achieve universal health 
coverage is by mandating that individuals either purchase health insurance or 
pay a penalty—called a “shared responsibility payment”—to the Internal Rev-
enue Service.3 Another important provision of the ACA, codified at Sec-
tion 4980H of the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.), regulates the employer-
provided health insurance market—the primary financing source of health in-
surance in the United States.4 Section 4980H requires employers with an “av-
erage of at least 50 full-time employees” to offer affordable health insurance to 
their employees or, instead, make an “assessable payment” to the IRS.5  
Congress’s decision to label the exaction in I.R.C. § 4980H an assessable 
payment poses a problem for certain nonprofit employers that use federal grant 
awards to fund their operations because of specific restrictions attached to 
these awards by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).6 This is be-
cause the OMB allows nonprofit organizations and other nonfederal entities to 
use federal awards for taxes, but not for fines or penalties.7 Because of the am-
                                                                                                                           
 2 See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (Supp. IV 2010) (discussing Congress’s economic motivation for 
enacting the ACA); Nicholas Drew, Note, Two Federally Subsidized Health Insurance Programs Are 
One Too Many: Reconsidering the Federal Income Tax Exclusion for Employer-Provided Health 
Insurance in Light of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 54 B.C. L. REV. 2047, 2061–62 
(2013) (stating that one of the ACA’s primary goals is to “facilitat[e] and ensur[e] universal health 
insurance coverage”). 
 3 I.R.C. § 5000A (2012) (discussing the ACA’s requirement that individuals maintain health 
insurance that meets a minimum standard and the ACA’s imposition of a penalty for an individual’s 
failure to meet this requirement); see 42 U.S.C. § 18091(1), (2)(A). Congress believed that the indi-
vidual mandate, together with other ACA provisions, would significantly increase the number of peo-
ple in the health insurance market, which would in turn increase “economies of scale” and lower 
health insurance costs. See 42 U.S.C § 18091(2)(J) (discussing Congress’s finding that increasing the 
size of health insurance purchasing pools should result in lower health insurance premiums). 
 4 See I.R.C. § 4980H (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 18091(D); Kathryn L. Moore, The Future of Employ-
ment-Based Health Insurance After the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 89 NEB. L. REV. 
885, 886–87 (2011) (noting that the U.S. health care industry is principally financed through employ-
er-provided health insurance and that the ACA both builds on, and strengthens, the employer-provided 
health insurance system). 
 5 See I.R.C. § 4980H. Section 4980H provides some exemptions for employers that do not meet 
the fifty full-time employee requirement for more than 120 days in a calendar year. Id. 
§ 4980H(c)(2)(B). 
 6 See Riley Lovendale & Eleanor Evans, After Health Care Reform Upheld, What’s Next for 
CAAs?, CAPLAWUPDATE, Fall 2012, at 6, 8–9, available at http://www.caplaw.org/resources/
PublicationDocuments/updatenewsletter/2012/CAPLAW_HealthCareReform_Fall2012.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7TRF-EMRU (explaining that it is unclear whether an assessable payment would be 
interpreted as a tax or a penalty and that this ambiguity affects organizations receiving certain federal 
awards because OMB funding restrictions allow the use of federal awards for taxes, but not for penal-
ties). 
 7 See 2 C.F.R. § 200.441 (2014) (stating that organizations may not use federal awards to pay 
penalties or fines resulting from a violation of, or failure to comply with, the law); id. § 200.470 (al-
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biguity inherent in the I.R.C. § 4980H term “assessable payment,” it is unclear 
whether the exaction for failing to offer affordable health care would be con-
sidered a tax or a penalty.8 
This Note argues that an assessable payment imposed by I.R.C. § 4980H 
should be considered a tax for federal award cost allowances.9 This conclusion 
is partly based on the U.S. Supreme Court’s 2012 decision in National Federa-
tion of Independent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB), in which the Court wrestled 
with a similar tax versus penalty issue and held that the ACA’s individual man-
date exaction could reasonably be interpreted as a tax despite Congress refer-
ring to it as a penalty.10 Using the NFIB Court’s analysis, an assessable pay-
ment in I.R.C. § 4980H should be considered a tax because: (1) the exaction 
effectively functions as a tax; and (2) the exaction’s particular characteristics 
are more consistent with those of a tax than a penalty.11 Though the NFIB 
Court was dealing with a constitutional—and not purely interpretive—
question, its analysis of the effects of the ACA’s individual mandate exaction—
an exaction similar to the one imposed by I.R.C. § 4980H—and subsequent 
scholarship support this Note’s conclusion that such an assessable payment 
should be interpreted as a tax under OMB federal award cost principles.12 
Part I examines the enactment, objectives, and some intricacies of the 
ACA, focusing on I.R.C. § 4980H and its effect on the employer-provided 
health insurance market.13 Part II analyzes the OMB’s restrictions on the use of 
federal awards by nonprofit organizations and other nonfederal entities.14 
Then, Part III analyzes methods for distinguishing taxes from penalties, includ-
ing the test articulated by the NFIB Court.15 Finally, Part IV applies this analy-
sis to I.R.C. § 4980H’s assessable payment and concludes that it should be in-
terpreted as a tax.16 
                                                                                                                           
lowing organizations to use federal funding to pay taxes); Lovendale & Evans, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
These OMB restrictions on the use of federal awards are often referred to as “cost principles.” 2 
C.F.R. § 200.400. 
 8 See I.R.C. § 4980H; 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.441, 200.470; Lovendale & Evans, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 9 See infra notes 133–171 and accompanying text. 
 10 See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2593–94, 2601 (2012) 
(stating that the ACA’s individual mandate is “constitutional, because it can reasonably be read as a 
tax”); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (providing that “Congress shall have Power To lay and 
collect Taxes”). 
 11 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–98; infra notes 148–171 and accompanying text. 
 12 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–98, 2601; 2 C.F.R. § 200.470; infra notes 148–171 and accompa-
nying text. 
 13 See infra notes 17–52 and accompanying text. 
 14 See infra notes 53–61 and accompanying text. 
 15 See infra notes 62–132 and accompanying text. 
 16 See infra notes 133–171 and accompanying text. 
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I. THE ACA: A SINGLE, COMPREHENSIVE SOLUTION TO REFORM THE 
HEALTH CARE MARKET 
The ACA is the most extensive reform of the American health care system 
in decades and aims to achieve nearly-universal health care coverage in the 
United States, while lowering the amount of spending in the health care indus-
try.17 To accomplish these lofty objectives, Congress included provisions in the 
ACA that impose new requirements on insurers, states, individuals (through the 
so-called “individual mandate”), and employers (through the so-called “employ-
er mandate”).18 Collectively, these provisions aim to reduce the number of unin-
sured individuals, which in turn would allow health care providers to pass on the 
savings to health insurers, which could then translate into savings for families 
purchasing insurance.19 
Section 5000A, which creates the ACA’s individual mandate, is the legisla-
tion’s most publicized and controversial provision and seeks to reduce the num-
ber of uninsured Americans by requiring that most individuals maintain health 
insurance that meets certain minimum requirements or, instead, pay a penalty.20 
It attempts to prevent individuals from waiting to purchase health insurance until 
they need it, a phenomenon referred to as “adverse selection.”21 To further re-
                                                                                                                           
 17 See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (Supp. IV 2010); Dustin D. Berger, The Management of Health Care 
Costs: Independent Medical Review After “ObamaCare,” 42 U. MEM. L. REV. 255, 256–58 (2011) 
(discussing the long-term “dramatic trend of increasing health care costs”); Moore, supra note 4, at 
886 (stating the “[ACA] fundamentally reforms the American health care system”); Drew, supra note 
2, at 2061 & n.105 (stating that the ACA is one of the most expansive legislative overhauls of the U.S. 
health insurance market in decades). 
 18 See I.R.C. § 4980H (2012) (imposing an exaction on most large employers that do not offer 
insurance to their employees that meets certain requirements); id. § 5000A (2012) (imposing an exac-
tion on most individuals who do not carry health insurance); 42 U.S.C. § 18031 (Supp. IV 2010) (re-
quiring states to facilitate a marketplace for health insurance plans to promote free market competition 
among insurance providers); Tom Baker, Health Insurance, Risk, and Responsibility After the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 1577, 1580–93 (2011) (discussing how the 
ACA reforms four major components of the health care industry: Medicare, Medicaid, the individual 
and small-group market, and the large-group market); Drew, supra note 2, at 2061–65 (stating that the 
extensive reforms set forth by the ACA have dramatically altered the health care landscape in the 
United States); Frederick Thide, Comment, In Search of Limiting Principles: The Eleventh Circuit 
Invalidates the Individual Mandate in Florida v. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 53 
B.C. L. REV. 359, 362–63 (2012) (discussing the ACA’s individual mandate, which Congress con-
cluded was “essential” to its plan to expand health coverage and reduce health care costs). 
 19 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 18091(2)(C), (F), (I)–(J) (providing Congress’s prediction that the ACA 
would simultaneously increase the number of people purchasing health insurance and decrease health 
insurance costs). 
 20 See I.R.C. § 5000A; 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I); Berger, supra note 17, at 257. 
 21 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(I); see I.R.C. § 5000A. Adverse selection occurs when low-risk individu-
als decide not to purchase health insurance priced to reflect an average risk because it seems like a bad 
deal to them. See Peter Siegelman, Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: An Exaggerated Threat, 
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duce adverse selection in the health insurance market, the ACA also forbids cer-
tain insurance industry practices, such as denying individuals health insurance 
for various reasons, including the existence of preexisting health conditions.22 
In addition to these measures, Congress also included two components in 
the ACA that address employer-provided health insurance.23 First, the ACA 
provides a “small employer health insurance credit” to small employers that 
contribute to their employees’ health insurance premiums during the taxable 
year.24 Second, the ACA’s employer mandate provision in I.R.C. § 4980H re-
quires certain employers to provide affordable (as defined by the ACA) health 
insurance to their employees or, instead, pay an assessable payment.25  
Section A of this Part examines I.R.C. § 4980H and discusses the assessa-
ble payment that employers must make to the IRS if they fail to offer afforda-
ble health insurance to their employees.26 Section B then analyzes the employ-
ers’ choice between making such assessable payments to the IRS or providing 
qualifying health insurance to their employees.27  
                                                                                                                           
113 YALE L.J. 1223, 1223 (2004). When this occurs, health insurance providers then charge the rate 
for average risk to an insurance pool that contains only high-risk individuals and end up losing money. 
See id. at 1224.  
 22 See 42 U.S.C. § 300gg-1(a) (Supp. IV 2010) (requiring health insurance providers to “accept 
every employer and individual in the [s]tate that applies for such coverage”); see id. § 300gg-3 (Supp. 
IV 2010) (stating that group health plans and health insurance providers “may not impose any preex-
isting condition exclusion[s]”). Congress defined a “preexisting condition exclusion” as a “limitation 
or exclusion of benefits relating to a condition based on the fact that the condition was present before 
the date of enrollment for such coverage, whether or not any medical advice, diagnosis, care, or treat-
ment was recommended or received before such date.” Id. § 300gg-3(1)(A). 
 23 See I.R.C. § 45R (2012) (establishing a health insurance credit for small employers); 
id. § 4980H (imposing an assessable payment on certain large employers that do not offer affordable 
health insurance to their employees). These two components are especially important as the majority 
of health care in the United States is financed primarily through an individual’s employer. See 42 
U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D) (Supp. IV 2010) (stating that the ACA builds upon and strengthens the “private 
employer-based health insurance system, which covers [176 million] Americans nationwide”); Moore, 
supra note 4, at 886 & nn.1–2 (stating that roughly 59% of the U.S. population was covered by em-
ployer-provided health insurance in 2009); id. at 887–90 (discussing the exponential growth of em-
ployer-provided health insurance from approximately 3% in 1930 due to factors including World War 
II wage caps that led to insurance being offered as a fringe benefit to employees and the favorable tax 
treatment given to payments of employee health insurance premiums made by employers). 
 24 I.R.C. § 45R(a); see Moore, supra note 4, at 912–17 (discussing the ACA’s small employer tax 
credit and its likely effect on the business decisions of companies that qualify for it); see also I.R.C. 
§ 45R(f) (outlining health insurance tax credits for small employers described under I.R.C. § 501(c), 
which are tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(a)). 
 25 I.R.C. § 4980H (2012) (imposing an exaction on employers that fail to provide affordable 
health insurance to their employees); see I.R.C. § 36B(c)(2)(C) (2012) (outlining coverage affordabil-
ity rules for the ACA).  
 26 See infra notes 28–42 and accompanying text. 
 27 See infra notes 43–52 and accompanying text. 
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A. Section 4980H: The ACA’s Employer Mandate Provision 
The ACA’s employer mandate provision, I.R.C. § 4980H, requires an exac-
tion from some employers that fail to offer their employees health insurance 
meeting certain statutory requirements.28 Though the spirit of I.R.C. § 4980H is 
the same now as it was in prior proposed versions of the provision, the terminol-
ogy used by Congress to describe the exaction is much different.29 Notably, in 
multiple prior versions of I.R.C. § 4980H, Congress used the term “tax” to refer 
to the exaction imposed on employers that fail to offer affordable health insur-
ance to their employees.30 As enacted, however, I.R.C. § 4980H imposes an ex-
action called an “assessable payment” on employers that fail to offer affordable 
health insurance to their employees.31 Congress’s politically motivated name 
change of I.R.C. § 4980H’s exaction from a “tax” now affects nonprofits and 
other nonfederal entities governed by OMB federal award cost principles, which 
do not contain explicit instructions as to whether an assessable payment would 
be treated as a tax or a penalty.32  
                                                                                                                           
 28 See I.R.C. § 4980H; Harvey D. Cotton & Leslie F. Arnould, Health Care Reform Yesterday & 
Tomorrow: The Impact of State and Federal Law on Employers, 7 J. HEALTH & BIOMEDICAL L. 91, 
99 (2011). The Obama administration sought to distance itself from the term “employer mandate” in a 
2010 publication. See THE WHITE HOUSE, THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT INCREASES CHOICE AND 
SAVING MONEY FOR SMALL BUSINESSES 1 (2010), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/files/
documents/health_reform_for_small_businesses.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R98G-Y949 (“The 
Affordable Care Act does not include an employer mandate.”). Rather than use the term employer 
mandate, the publication states that, “as a matter of fairness,” the ACA requires large employers to 
make an assessable payment “only if they don’t provide affordable coverage.” See id. 
 29 Compare I.R.C. § 4980H (imposing an “assessable payment” on large employers that fail to 
offer affordable health insurance to their employees), with America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 
1796, 111th Cong. § 1306 (2009) (imposing a “tax” on employers that fail to satisfy certain health 
coverage participation requirements), and Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th 
Cong. § 511 (as passed by the House, Nov. 7, 2009) (same). 
 30 See S. 1796 § 1306; H.R. 3962 § 511. 
 31 I.R.C. § 4980H (2012). 
 32 See id.; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94, 2655 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that “[t]axes have never 
been popular . . . [and] must originate in the legislative body most accountable to the people, where legis-
lators must weigh the need for the tax against the terrible price they might pay at their next election” and 
concluding that “[w]e have no doubt that Congress knew precisely what it was doing when it rejected an 
earlier version of this legislation that imposed a tax instead of a requirement-with-penalty”); 2 C.F.R. 
§ 200.441 (2014) (stating that organizations may not use federal awards to pay penalties or fines); id. 
§ 200.470 (allowing organizations to use federal awards to pay taxes); David Orentlicher, Response, 
Constitutional Challenges to the Health Care Mandate: Based in Politics, Not Law, 160 U. PA. L. REV. 
PENNUMBRA 19, 29 (2011), http://www.pennumbra.com/responses/09-2011/Orentlicher.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/F7WV-A4KR(positing that “Congress and President Barack Obama characterized [the 
ACA shared responsibility payment] as a penalty rather than a tax because they knew that taxes are un-
popular”); Jacqueline Klingebiel, Obama: Mandate Is Not a Tax, ABC NEWS BLOG (Sep. 20, 2009, 9:00 
AM), http://www.abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/09/obama-mandate-is-not-a-tax/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/G4T9-FJAX (detailing an interview in which President Obama discusses the ACA’s 
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Beginning in either 2015 or 2016 (depending on its number of employ-
ees),33 an “applicable large employer” will be required to make assessable 
payments if it fails to satisfy its I.R.C. § 4980H requirement of offering afford-
able health insurance to its employees.34 An employer may fail to meet its ob-
ligations under I.R.C. § 4980H in one of two ways: (1) by failing to offer its 
full-time employees (and their dependents) the opportunity to enroll in “mini-
mum essential coverage”35 under an employer-provided health insurance plan, 
and having at least one full-time employee who is certified to claim an “appli-
                                                                                                                           
individual mandate and states that the “responsibility to get health insurance is absolutely not a tax in-
crease”). 
 33 See I.R.C. § 4980H (stating that the original effective date of the ACA’s employer mandate 
was January 1, 2014); Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 
8544, 8574 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 54, and 301) (providing extended tran-
sition relief through 2015 for employers that meet certain eligibility requirements, including the re-
quirement that the average number of full-time employees they employ in 2014 is between fifty and 
ninety-nine); I.R.S. Notice 2013-45, 2013-31 I.R.B. 116 (providing “transition relief,” which effec-
tively postpones I.R.C. § 4980H’s implementation for all employers through 2014); MARY ANN 
CHIRBA ET AL., HEALTH CARE REFORM: LAW AND PRACTICE § 2.02[1] & n.4 (2013) (discussing the 
Obama administration’s unilateral delays of the implementation of I.R.C. § 4980H, which have been 
called illegal by some critics). These delays in the implementation of I.R.C. § 4980H are motivated in 
large part by the complexity of the numerous requirements that the ACA imposes on employers, espe-
cially for those that did not previously offer health insurance to their employees. See Shared Respon-
sibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 8574.  
 34 I.R.C. § 4980H; see CHIRBA ET AL., supra note 33, § 2.02[2] (outlining the structure of I.R.C. 
§ 4980H and the incentives that Congress provided therein to ensure that employers offer their em-
ployees affordable health insurance). Congress defined an “applicable large employer” as “an em-
ployer who employed an average of at least 50 full-time employees on business days during the pre-
ceding calendar year.” Id. § 4980H(c)(2)(A). Elaborating further, Congress defined “full-time em-
ployee” as one that, with respect to any given month, is employed for an average of “at least 30 hours 
of service per week.” Id. § 4980H(c)(4)(A). The ACA, however, also provides that, only for the pur-
pose of determining if an employer is an “applicable large employer,” an employer must (in addition 
to its calculated number of full-time employees) divide the total number of hours worked by non-full-
time employees by 120. Id. § 4980H(c)(2)(E). This number of “[f]ull-time equivalents” must then be 
added to the regular full-time employee count. Id. In 2012, the IRS published a notice describing this 
process of determining the number of full-time employees. See I.R.S. Notice 2012-58, 2012-41 I.R.B. 
436. Additionally, the ACA provides that an employer will not be considered to employ more than 
fifty full-time employees if either: (1) its workforce only exceeds fifty full-time employees for 120 or 
fewer days during the calendar year; or (2) the employees in excess of fifty employed during that 120-
day period were “seasonal workers.” See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(B) (defining “seasonal worker[s]” in 
either the same way as the Secretary of Labor does or as “retail workers” employed during the holiday 
season). 
 35 I.R.C. § 5000A(f) (2012). Section 5000A(f) defines “minimum essential coverage” as includ-
ing, among a variety of other options, an “eligible employer-sponsored plan” and health plans offered 
in a state’s individual market. Id. “Eligible employer-sponsored plan[s]” are group health insurance 
plans that employers offer to their employees which are either government plans or plans offered in 
the small or large group markets within a given state. Id. § 5000A(f)(2). 
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cable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction;”36 or (2) by offering its 
full-time employees (and their dependents) an opportunity to enroll in mini-
mum essential coverage, and still having at least one full-time employee who 
is certified to claim the applicable premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduc-
tion.37 Thus, an employer must make an assessable payment under I.R.C. 
                                                                                                                           
 36 See id. § 4980H(a); see also id. § 4980H(c)(3) (defining “applicable premium tax credit and 
cost-sharing reduction”). Requiring that at least one full-time employee be certified for a premium tax 
credit or cost-sharing reduction is in accordance with the ACA’s commitment to making health insur-
ance more affordable for individuals. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(F) (Supp. IV 2010). Generally, an 
employee will be eligible for a premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction for health coverage, spe-
cifically for “qualified health plans,” purchased through an exchange if several conditions are met. See 
id. § 18031(d) (Supp. V 2011) (defining a “qualified health plan” as a health insurance plan made 
available to qualified individuals and employers on a state-run exchange); 42 U.S.C. § 18081 (Supp. 
IV 2010) (laying out procedures for determining eligibility for premium tax credits and reduced cost-
sharing); Moore, supra note 4, at 905 (same). First, the employee’s annual household income must be 
between 100% and 400% of the federal poverty line. See I.R.C. § 36B(b)(3)(A) (2012); see also id. 
§ 36B(d)(3) (providing for future changes to the federal poverty line by specifying the use of the 
“most recently published poverty line” as of the first day of a health insurance plan’s regular enroll-
ment period begins). Second, either: (1) the employee must be ineligible to participate in an employer-
provided health insurance plan; or (2) the employer-provided health insurance plan must be unafford-
able. See id. § 36B(c)(2)(C). An employer-provided health insurance plan is unaffordable when either: 
(1) the employee’s premium under the plan exceeds 9.5% of the employee’s annual household in-
come; or (2) the “plan’s share of the total allowed costs of benefits provided under the plan is less than 
60 percent of such costs.” See id. “Household income” is defined as an amount determined by adding 
the “modified adjusted gross income of the taxpayer” to the total “modified adjusted gross incomes” 
of every other person who: (1) was “taken into account in determining the taxpayer’s family size;” and 
(2) was also required to file an income tax return. See id. § 36B(d)(2). Because the affordability of 
insurance (defined as premiums costing no more than 9.5% of household income) is determined by 
referencing the income of a taxpayer’s spouse and dependents, employers may have difficulty deter-
mining the affordability of the health insurance that they offer to their employees. See id. 
§ 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)(II); I.R.S. Notice 2011-73, 2011-40 I.R.B. 474 at 2–3. To remedy this issue, the 
Department of the Treasury and the IRS created an “affordability safe harbor” that would allow em-
ployers to determine insurance affordability by referencing their employees’ wages reported on their 
Form W-2 tax documentation. See Treas. Reg. § 54.4980H–5(e) (2014); Shared Responsibility for 
Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 8564; I.R.S. Notice 2012-17, 2012-9 I.R.B. 
430; I.R.S. Notice 2011-73, 2011-40 I.R.B. 474. As long as an employee’s required contribution for a 
calendar year does not exceed 9.5% of “that employee’s Form W–2 wages from the employer,” the 
insurance will be considered affordable. Treas. Reg. § 54.4980H–5(e)(ii). The idea is that if employer-
provided health insurance was affordable based just on the employee’s Form W-2 wages, it would 
also be affordable in light of that employee’s household income because the premium would then be 
an even smaller percentage of that total household income. See I.R.S. Notice 2011-73, 2011-40 I.R.B. 
474. It was unclear whether this approach would be approved, however, because it creates a loophole 
where employers must simply limit each of their employee’s premiums to just below 9.5% of the 
employee’s pay to ensure they do not have to make an assessable payment. See Robert Book, The IRS 
Employer Mandate Loophole, FORBES (Aug. 6, 2012, 1:58 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/aroy/
2012/08/06/the-irs-employer-mandate-loophole/, archived at http://perma.cc/7UPU-8DPE. 
 37 See I.R.C. § 4980H(b) (2012). 
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§ 4980H either if it fails to offer health insurance to its employees or if it offers 
unaffordable health insurance to its employees.38 
The amount of an assessable payment imposed on an employer depends 
on whether the employer fails to offer health insurance at all or simply fails to 
provide affordable health insurance.39 If an employer fails to offer any health 
insurance to its full-time employees, its monthly assessable payment will be 
$167 for each of its full-time employees, not including the first thirty employ-
ees.40 If an employer fails to provide affordable health insurance to its full-
time employees, its monthly assessable payment will be $250 for each full-
time employee who opts out of the employer-provided plan and receives a 
premium tax credit or cost-sharing reduction after enrolling in a qualified 
health plan elsewhere.41 Additionally, Congress provided for future inflation 
adjustments of I.R.C. § 4980H’s assessable payment amounts.42 
                                                                                                                           
 38 See id. § 4980H(a)–(b); supra notes 35–37 and accompanying text. 
 39 See I.R.C. § 4980H(a)–(b); see also Treas. Reg. §§ 54.4980H–4(d), 54.4980H–5(d) (2014) 
(stating that “[f]or a calendar month, an applicable large employer member may be liable for an as-
sessable payment under section 4980H(a) or under section 4980H(b), but will not be liable for an 
assessable payment under both”). 
 40 See I.R.C. § 4980H(a), (c)(1). More specifically, § 4980H(a) requires that for employers not 
offering health insurance to their employees, their assessable payment is determined by the “product 
of the applicable payment amount” and the number of full-time employees employed that month. See 
id. § 4980H(a). Congress later defined “applicable payment amount” as $167. Id. § 4980H(c)(1). 
Congress provided employers with a break in their full-time employee calculation by requiring the 
total number of full-time employees to be reduced by thirty “for purposes of calculating” their assess-
able payment liability under I.R.C. § 4980H(a). See id. § 4980H(c)(2)(D). 
 41 See id. § 4980H(b); Moore, supra note 4, at 905–06. Section 4980H(b)(1)(B) states that if an 
employer offers unaffordable health insurance to its employees, its assessable payment is “equal to the 
product of the number of full-time employees” that obtain the premium tax credit or cost-sharing 
reduction and “an amount equal to [one-twelfth] of $3,000,” or $250. I.R.C. § 4980H(b)(1)(B). Thus, 
an employer’s assessable payment for offering unaffordable health insurance is based on the number 
of employees who decide not to purchase the employer-provided health insurance instead of its total 
number of full-time employees. See id. One scholar offers the following illustration of the practical 
difference this distinction between I.R.C. § 4980H(a) and I.R.C. § 4980H(b) provides: 
[S]uppose that an applicable large employer has seventy-five full-time employees and 
does not offer its full-time employees and their dependents coverage under an eligible 
employer-sponsored group health plan for a month. Two full-time employees are certi-
fied to claim a premium assistance tax credit or cost sharing reduction. The employer 
will be subject to a penalty equal to $7500 for that month. In contrast, if the same em-
ployer offered coverage and the same two employees opted out, the employer would 
only be subject to a penalty equal to $500. 
Moore, supra note 4, at 906. 
 42 See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(5). For each calendar year after 2014, the current assessable payment 
annual caps of either $2000 or $3000 per employee will be multiplied by a “premium adjustment 
percentage.” Id. Currently, the “premium adjustment percentage” is calculated by the percentage by 
which the “average per capita premium for health insurance” for the prior calendar year exceeds the 
“average per capita premium for 2013.” 42 U.S.C. § 18022(c)(4) (Supp. IV 2010). 
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B. Section 4980H’s Effect on Employer-Provided Health Insurance 
Because I.R.C. § 4980H does not take effect until 2015 at the earliest, 
employers are now in planning and preparation mode as they analyze the effect 
of the ACA’s employer mandate on their business.43 Though Congress intend-
ed I.R.C. § 4980H to motivate employers to provide affordable health insur-
ance to their employers, some suggest that it remains unclear whether the pro-
vision will actually have this effect.44 Even though I.R.C. § 4980H has not tak-
en effect, one recent study shows that the percentage of the nonelderly popula-
tion receiving employer-provided health insurance is already slowly—but 
steadily—dropping, while the percentage of the same population receiving 
government-provided health insurance is increasing.45  
Most employers can save money by simply paying the assessable pay-
ment required by I.R.C. § 4980H instead of offering affordable health insur-
ance to their employees.46 This is the case because an employer’s maximum 
                                                                                                                           
 43 See TOWERS WATSON, HEALTH CARE REFORM: LOOMING FEARS MASK UNPRECEDENTED 
EMPLOYER OPPORTUNITIES TO MITIGATE COSTS, RISKS AND RESET TOTAL REWARDS 3 (2010), 
available at http://www.towerswatson.com/~/media/Pdf/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/
2010/05/Post-HCR_Flash_survey_bulletin_5_25_101.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R7BB-MA23 
(stating that the employer-respondents’ “most pressing short-term actions focus on . . . modeling the 
financial impact of health care reform on their organization”); supra note 33 and accompanying text 
(discussing the delayed implementation of I.R.C. § 4980H). 
 44 Compare David A. Hyman, Employment-Based Health Insurance: Is Health Reform a ‘Game 
Changer?’ 13–14 (Univ. Ill. Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. LE10-010, 2010; Ill. Pub. Law Research, 
Paper No. 10-17, 2010), available at http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=1624311, archived at http://
perma.cc/Q8ZY-2PHH (stating the likely result of the of the ACA’s employer mandate will be that 
“some employers will make all-or-nothing coverage decisions for all employees in favor of ‘nothing’”), 
and Grace-Marie Turner, No, You Can’t Keep Your Health Insurance, WALL ST. J. (June 8, 2011, 1:38 
PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702304432304576371252181401600.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/M9JY-5T92 (predicting that “ObamaCare will lead to a dramatic decline in employer-
provided health insurance” requiring up to 78 million Americans to find health insurance from other 
sources), with Moore, supra note 4, at 909–10 (discussing the results of two surveys: in one survey, 88% 
of surveyed employers answered that they would continue to—or likely would continue to—provide 
health insurance to their employees; in a second survey, 87% of respondents said that they would contin-
ue to offer health insurance because it is important for employee recruiting and retention purposes), and 
id. at 921 (concluding that the ACA’s three main incentives regarding employer-provided health insur-
ance benefits are “unlikely to change significantly the number of employers that elect to offer” employer-
provided health insurance). 
 45 See Paul Fronstin, Sources of Health Insurance and Characteristics of the Uninsured: Analysis 
of the March 2012 Current Population Survey, EBRI ISSUE BRIEFS, Sept. 2012, at 4, 5, available at 
http://www.ebri.org/pdf/briefspdf/EBRI_IB_09-2012_No376_Sources.pdf, archived at http://perma.
cc/529Z-G4H9 (presenting data showing the percentage of the nonelderly population with employer-
provided health insurance dropped from 63.5% in 2007 to 58.4% in 2011, while the percentage of the 
same population receiving insurance from public sources rose from 18.3% in 2007 to 22.5% in 2011). 
 46 Moore, supra note 4, at 906 (“The penalty [the ACA] imposes on employers who fail to offer 
employees affordable health care coverage is relatively low compared with prevailing health insurance 
costs.”); Shubham Singhal et al., How US Health Care Reform Will Affect Employee Benefits, MCKIN-
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annual assessable payment per employee is either $2000 or $3000, whereas an 
employer’s average annual cost for an employee’s health insurance premium is 
roughly $4000 for an individual and $11,000 for a family.47 
Comparing the costs of an assessable payment with providing affordable 
health insurance is not the only consideration for employers deciding whether 
to provide, or continue to provide, affordable health insurance to their employ-
ees.48 One additional consideration for employers is the different tax implica-
tions that result from paying I.R.C. § 4980H’s assessable payments as opposed 
to paying for a portion of an employee’s health insurance premium.49 Section 
4980H explicitly forbids an employer from deducting assessable payments on 
its tax return, whereas an employer may currently deduct its contributions to its 
employees’ health plans as business expenses.50 Another consideration for em-
                                                                                                                           
SEY & CO. (June 2011), http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/health_systems_and_services/how_
us_health_care_reform_will_affect_employee_benefits, archived at http://perma.cc/ZKR2-55PY (stating 
that “[a]t least 30 percent of employers would gain economically from dropping coverage even if they 
completely compensated employees for the change”); Shawn Tully, Documents Reveal AT&T, Verizon, 
Others, Thought About Dropping Employer-Sponsored Benefits, CNN MONEY (May 6, 2010, 11:52 
AM), http://www.money.cnn.com/2010/05/05/news/companies/dropping_benefits.fortune/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9SP-MZU3 (“AT&T revealed that it spends $2.4 billion a year on coverage for its almost 
300,000 active employees, a number that would fall to $600 million if AT&T stopped providing health 
care coverage and paid the [assessable payment] instead.”). 
 47 See I.R.C. § 4980H (2012); JAMES M. BRANSCOME, AGENCY FOR HEALTHCARE RESEARCH & 
QUALITY, STATISTICAL BRIEF #375: STATE DIFFERENCES IN THE COST OF JOB-RELATED HEALTH 
INSURANCE, 2011 at 2, 5 (2010), available at http://www.meps.ahrq.gov/data_files/publications/st375/
stat375.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/4TUB-U2PX. This study reports that, in 2011, the average 
nationwide health insurance premiums were $5222 for individual coverage and $15,022 for family 
coverage. BRANSCOME, supra, at 2. One study concluded that the average 2011 annual contributions 
by employees toward their own health insurance premiums was $1090 for individual coverage and 
$3962 for family coverage. Id. at 3. Subtracting the employees’ contributions from their total premi-
ums leaves an annual average cost to employers of $4132 for individual plans and $11,060 for family 
plans. See id. at 1, 3.  
 48 See Moore, supra note 4, at 908–09 (discussing additional factors for employer consideration 
including, tax deductions, employees’ demands for higher wages, and its effect on recruiting and re-
tention). 
 49 See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(7); Moore, supra note 4, at 908. 
 50 Compare I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(7) (denying employers a “deduction for the tax imposed” by 
§ 4980H), with id. § 105(b) (2012) (excluding from an employee’s gross income the amounts paid to 
them by their employers for medical care expenses incurred by the taxpayer for themselves, their 
spouses, and their dependents), id. § 106(a) (2012) (excluding, in most cases, from an employee’s 
gross income the amounts of employer-provided health or accident insurance plans), id. § 162 (2012) 
(allowing employers a deduction for “ordinary and necessary” business expenses paid during the tax-
able year), and Treas. Reg. § 1.162–10(a) (2014) (specifying “medical expense[s]” paid during the 
taxable year as deductible business expenses). The advantage of these provisions in the I.R.C. is that 
the amounts spent or received in relation to employer-provided health insurance are excluded from an 
employee’s pre-tax income; if employees purchase health insurance on their own, they must pay for it 
with after-tax dollars. Compare I.R.C. § 106(a) (excluding the amount of employer-provided health 
insurance from an employee’s gross income without a requirement that an employee contribute a 
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ployers is the possible demand of higher wages from their employees if health 
insurance benefits are no longer included as part of their compensation pack-
age.51 Other factors that scholars have identified for an employer’s considera-
tion include recruiting, retention, and ensuring continued employee productivi-
ty.52 
II. TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS AND COST GUIDANCE FOR ALLOWABLE 
USES OF FEDERAL AWARDS 
One type of large employer that will be affected by the ACA’s employer 
mandate is a tax-exempt organization (a “nonprofit”) under I.R.C. § 501.53 
Nonprofits employ roughly ten percent of the U.S. workforce and the nonprof-
its that employ over fifty full-time employees will be subject to the require-
                                                                                                                           
certain amount), with id. § 213(a) (2012) (providing that individuals’ medical care expenses are only 
deductible “to the extent that such expenses exceed 10 percent of adjusted gross income”). The ACA 
provides individuals with some additional tax relief for health insurance expenses through the premi-
um tax credit or cost-sharing reduction discussed previously. See supra note 36 and accompanying 
text. 
 51 See MERCER, HEALTH CARE REFORM: IMPACT ON EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLANS BEGINS TO 
EMERGE 4 (2010), available at http://www.mercer.com/attachment.dyn?idContent=1296645&filePath=/
attachments/English/Mercer_HCR_Perspective_June2010.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/JN82-39UK 
(“The ‘savings’ to an employer are not simply the difference between current cost and the penalty. Em-
ployees will expect some compensation adjustment to help them buy coverage in the individual market 
. . . .”); Moore, supra note 4, at 908–09 (“[H]ealth care coverage is a form of nontaxable compensation to 
employees, and employees may demand higher wages if employers elect to eliminate coverage.”). 
 52 See Moore, supra note 4, at 909; Singhal et al., supra note 46, at 7. 
 53 See I.R.C. § 501 (2012); id. § 4980H (2012). Tax-exempt organizations are also commonly 
referred to as “nonprofits,” but the terms are not identical; to qualify as tax-exempt, an organization 
must file appropriate paperwork with the IRS. See Treas. Reg. § 1.501(a)–1(a)(2) (2014) (“An organi-
zation . . . is not exempt from tax merely because it is not organized and operated for profit.”); BORIS 
I. BITTKER & LAWRENCE LOKKEN, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME, ESTATES AND GIFTS pt. 14 
¶ 100.1.1 (rev. 3d ed. Supp. 2006) (discussing the exemption of charitable organizations from taxation 
extending back to the “English Statute of Charitable Uses of 1601” as well as early state constitu-
tions); Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit Organizations from Federal 
Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 301 (1976) (same). Several policy rationales historically justified 
federal income tax exemptions for these organizations: (1) a disconnect between the concept of in-
come and the organization’s objectives; (2) small potential for tax revenues; (3) administrative diffi-
culties arising from these organizations’ heavy reliance on volunteers; and (4) the benefits of these 
organizations’ activities on society. See, e.g., Green v. Connally, 330 F. Supp. 1150, 1157–61 (D.D.C. 
1971) (emphasizing the “public benefits arising” from nonprofit organizations (internal quotations 
omitted)), aff’d sub nom. Coit v. Green, 404 U.S. 997 (1971); BITTKER & LOKKEN, supra, ¶ 100.1.3. 
The most important, and probably best-known, tax-exempt organizations are classified as charitable 
organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), which requires the organization to be “operated exclusively for 
religious, charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or educational purposes” to qualify 
for an I.R.C. § 501(a) tax exemption. See I.R.C. § 501(a), (c)(3); Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)–1(a) 
(2014). 
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ments of I.R.C. § 4980H.54 In order to cover their operating costs, many non-
profits utilize federal grant awards—in addition to private donations—as a sig-
nificant source of funding.55 To ensure that nonprofits, and other nonfederal 
entities, use federal awards judiciously and for the purposes for which they 
were intended, the OMB has issued official cost guidance for them.56  
                                                                                                                           
 54 See I.R.C. § 4980H; MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & JANE G. GRAVELLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 
R40919, AN OVERVIEW OF THE NONPROFIT AND CHARITABLE SECTOR 4 (2009), available at http://
www.councilofnonprofits.org/files/crs-overview-nonprofit-charitable-sector.pdf, archived at http://
perma.cc/5JFF-HF2J. 
 55 See AMY BLACKWOOD ET AL., URBAN INST., THE NONPROFIT SECTOR IN BRIEF: PUBLIC 
CHARITIES, GIVING AND VOLUNTEERING, 2012, at 1–3 (2012), available at http://www.urban.org/
UploadedPDF/412674-The-Nonprofit-Sector-in-Brief.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/TK65-R68X 
(reporting that, in 2010, government grants composed 8.3% of the $1.51 trillion in revenues for public 
charities and that the total amount donated by individuals as private charitable contributions was over 
$298 billion in 2011). A 2009 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO) stated that 
in the 2006 fiscal year nonprofits received a significant amount of assistance through federal funds. 
U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-193, NONPROFIT SECTOR: SIGNIFICANT FEDERAL 
FUNDS REACH THE SECTOR THROUGH VARIOUS MECHANISMS, BUT MORE COMPLETE AND RELIA-
BLE FUNDING DATA ARE NEEDED 4 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09193.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/T5W7-5JZS. The GAO reported that in 2009 nonprofits received approx-
imately $25 billion in “direct grants,” $55 billion in grant funds that first flow through a state, and $10 
billion in federal contracts. See id. 
 56 See 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.400–475 (2014) (outlining federal award cost principles for nonfederal 
entities); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-122 
(COST PRINCIPLES FOR NON-PROFIT ORGANIZATIONS) (2004) (codified in 2 C.F.R. pt. 230 (2013)); 
see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-21 
(COST PRINCIPLES FOR EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS) (2004) (codified in 2 C.F.R. pt. 220 (2013)) 
(performing the same function for educational institutions as OMB Circular A-122 performed for 
nonprofits); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OMB CIRCULAR A-87 
(COST PRINCIPLES FOR STATE, LOCAL, AND INDIAN TRIBAL GOVERNMENTS) (2004) (codified in 2 
C.F.R. pt. 225 (2013)) (performing the same function for government entities as OMB Circular A-122 
performed for nonprofits). On July 8, 1980, the OMB issued Circular A-122 to provide nonprofit 
organizations with cost principles to be used for determining whether certain costs could be paid with 
federal awards. See Circular A-122, “Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations,” 45 Fed. Reg. 
46022 (July 8, 1980). On December 26, 2013, the OMB, together with the Council on Financial Assis-
tance Reform, streamlined the cost guidance and other requirements for nonprofits receiving federal 
awards formerly contained in OMB Circular A-122 (as well as similar guidance and requirements for 
hospitals, institutions of higher education, state and local governments, and Indian tribes formerly 
contained in other OMB circulars) by enacting uniform guidance which supersedes and combines the 
various OMB circulars. See 2 C.F.R. § 200.100 (“This Part establishes uniform administrative re-
quirements, cost principles, and audit requirements for Federal awards to non-Federal entities . . . .”); 
Uniform Administrative Requirements, Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, 
78 Fed. Reg. 78590 (Dec. 26, 2013) (codified at 2 C.F.R. pts. 200, 215, 220, 225, and 230). The effec-
tive date of these reforms will be one year from the publication of the OMB’s uniform guidance, De-
cember 26, 2014. 2 C.F.R. § 200.110. This massive overhaul of previous cost and administrative 
guidance for these organizations was prompted by two objectives: (1) to condense guidance for feder-
al awards to reduce the administrative burden on nonfederal entities; and (2) strengthen oversight over 
federal awards to reduce risks of “waste, fraud, and abuse.” Uniform Administrative Requirements, 
Cost Principles, and Audit Requirements for Federal Awards, 78 Fed. Reg. at 78590. The OMB has 
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As it now stands, the OMB’s cost guidance does not let nonprofits, or 
other nonfederal entities, subject to I.R.C. § 4980H’s employer mandate know 
whether an assessable payment would be an allowable use of federal award 
funds.57 Under 2 C.F.R. § 200.470, taxes are generally “allowable” costs.58 
Under 2 C.F.R. § 200.441, however, the costs of fines and penalties resulting 
from the violation of laws or regulations are “unallowable.”59 This distinction 
matters because if a nonprofit60 uses a federal award for unallowable costs, the 
                                                                                                                           
also extended these cost principles to “subawards,” recognizing that, because of the way certain grants 
are structured, an organization may receive its federal funding after it has passed through a state gov-
ernment or other entity first. See id. § 200.92 (defining “subaward”); id. § 200.332 (allowing pass-
through entities to provide subawards if they meet certain other requirements in the OMB’s uniform 
guidance). 
 57 See 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.441, 200.470; Lovendale & Evans, supra note 6, at 8–9. Though this Note 
focuses on how the ambiguity in the labeling of I.R.C. § 4980H’s “assessable payment” affects non-
profits receiving federal awards, the same ambiguity also affects other nonfederal entities receiving 
federal awards, including state and local governments, Indian tribes, and institutions of higher educa-
tion. See 2 C.F.R. § 200.69 (defining the term “[n]on-Federal entity”); id. § 200.100 (stating that the 
OMB uniform guidance for federal awards applies to nonfederal entities); id. § 200.441 (stating that 
fines and penalties are unallowable costs); id. § 200.470 (stating that taxes are usually allowable 
costs). The OMB’s uniform guidance provides that a cost is “allowable” under a federal award if sev-
en criteria are met. See id. § 200.403. First, the cost must “[b]e necessary and reasonable for the per-
formance of the Federal award and be allocable thereto.” Id. § 200.403(a). Second, the cost must con-
form to the conditions or limitations of the OMB cost principles or the federal award itself with re-
spect to types or amounts of costs. See id. § 200.403(b). Third, the cost must be consistent with “poli-
cies and procedures” uniformly applied to the organization’s activities, whether carried out with fed-
eral awards or not. See id. § 200.403(c). Fourth, the cost must “[b]e accorded consistent treatment.” 
See id. § 200.403(d). Fifth, the cost must be tracked with “generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP).” See id. § 200.403(e). Sixth, the cost cannot be used to meet “cost sharing or matching re-
quirements of any other federally-financed program.” See id. § 200.403(f). Seventh, the cost must 
“[b]e adequately documented.” See id. § 200.403(g). Notably, the OMB’s uniform guidance provides 
that whether a certain cost is an allowable use of a federal award may also be governed by that 
award’s terms, and this definition trumps the OMB’s specific cost guidance. Id. § 200.420. 
 58 See id. § 200.470(b) (“In general, taxes which the non-Federal entity is required to pay and 
which are paid or accrued in accordance with GAAP . . . are allowable . . . .”). This provision, howev-
er, contains exceptions for three types of taxes which are unallowable costs for a nonprofit: (1) taxes 
from which exemptions are available to the organization directly or available from the federal gov-
ernment; (2) special land assessments; and (3) “Federal income taxes.” Id. 
 59 See id. § 200.441 (“Costs resulting from non-Federal entity violations of, alleged violations of, 
or failure to comply with, Federal, state, tribal, local, or foreign laws and regulations are unallowable 
. . . .”). The only exceptions are when these costs are incurred as a result of complying with: (1) the 
specific award terms; or (2) written instructions from the “Federal awarding agency.” Id. 
 60 Id. § 200.70 (defining “[n]onprofit organization” for OMB uniform guidance purposes). Im-
portantly, the OMB also explicitly excluded some types of nonprofits from its cost principles for fed-
eral awards. See id. § 200.401(c) (“Some nonprofit organizations, because of their size and nature of 
operations, can be considered to be similar to for-profit entities for purpose of applicability of cost 
principles.”); id. pt. 200, App. VIII (listing specific nonprofits that are not subject to OMB cost prin-
ciples, including various research institutes, nonprofit insurance providers “such as Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield Organizations,” and “[o]ther [nonprofits] as negotiated with Federal awarding agencies”). 
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awarding agency may require the funds be returned or may even terminate the 
entire federal award.61 
III. TAX OR PENALTY? COMPETING INTERPRETATIONS OF THE ASSESSABLE 
PAYMENT IMPOSED BY SECTION 4980H 
Because Congress used the term “assessable payment” to describe the ex-
action in I.R.C. § 4980H, it is unclear whether this exaction would be consid-
ered a tax or a penalty under the OMB’s cost principles.62 The language Con-
gress used in I.R.C. § 4980H makes it unclear whether the exaction should be 
considered a tax or a penalty because I.R.C. § 4980H uses both terms when 
referring to the assessable payment.63  
The Supreme Court, in National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius (NFIB), grappled with this type of interpretive dilemma in 2012 when 
it examined the constitutionality of the ACA’s individual mandate in light of 
Congress’s Taxing Power.64 The Court concluded that the ACA’s individual 
mandate exaction could reasonably be interpreted as a tax despite Congress 
labeling it a “shared responsibility payment.”65 To reach this conclusion, the 
Court analyzed how the shared responsibility payment functioned, as opposed 
to focusing on its congressional label.66 Although NFIB dealt with a constitu-
tional—and not a purely interpretive—question, the Court’s analysis can be 
used to determine whether an assessable payment under I.R.C. § 4980H is a 
tax or a penalty by evaluating (1) how the exaction functions, and (2) its mate-
rial characteristics.67 When evaluating an assessable payment’s material char-
acteristics, one should consider the language Congress used to describe the 
                                                                                                                           
 61 See 45 C.F.R. pt. 16, app. A , para. C (2013). If a nonprofit wishes to challenge the determina-
tion that its use of a federal award was unallowable, it may do so at an administrative hearing; should 
it choose to appeal the result of that hearing, the Department of Health and Human Services has grant-
ed the Departmental Appeals Board authority to handle appeals of these grant disputes. See id.; Appel-
late Division, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., http://www.hhs.gov/dab/divisions/appellate/
index.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4K3D-KFCE (last visited Apr. 16, 2014) (stating that the Ap-
pellate Division of the Departmental Appeals Board “provides de novo review” of final decisions, 
including those for grant “disallowances, terminations and denials of refunding”). 
 62 See I.R.C. § 4980H (2012); 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.441, 200.470 (2014); Lovendale & Evans, supra 
note 6, at 8–9. 
 63 See I.R.C. § 4980H; infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
 64 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1; Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 
2566, 2593–94 (2012). 
 65 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601; see I.R.C. § 5000A (2012); infra notes 93–108 and accompanying 
text. 
 66 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–98. 
 67 See id.; Robert D. Cooter & Neil S. Siegel, Not the Power to Destroy: An Effects Theory of the 
Tax Power, 98 VA. L. REV. 1195, 1222–23 (2012) (discussing how the material characteristics of 
taxes differ from those of penalties). 
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exaction, the conduct Congress sought to regulate, and the magnitude and con-
ditions of the exaction.68 
Section A analyzes the conflicting tax versus penalty terminology Con-
gress used to describe the assessable payment in I.R.C. § 4980H.69 Section B 
then discusses the reasoning that the NFIB Court used to interpret the ACA’s 
shared responsibility payment as a tax.70 Finally, Section C examines addition-
al characteristics of exactions like I.R.C. § 4980H’s assessable payment.71 
A. Conflicting Tax and Penalty Terminology in I.R.C. § 4980H 
It is unclear whether an assessable payment imposed on employers by the 
ACA would be interpreted as a tax or penalty because Congress refers to the ex-
action using both terms in I.R.C. § 4980H.72 In some instances, I.R.C. § 4980H 
characterizes an assessable payment as a “penalty.”73 For example, the heading 
for one provision in I.R.C. § 4980H refers specifically to “assessable penal-
ties.”74 Congress also specified that assessable payments shall be calculated and 
paid in the same way “as an assessable penalty” under another chapter of the 
I.R.C.75 Finally, proposed regulations to provide guidance under I.R.C. § 4980H 
reference a “penalty” imposed by the section a total of three times.76 
Conversely, another provision, I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(7), refers to the assess-
able payment as a “tax.”77 Section 4980H(c)(7) explicitly denies large employ-
ers a tax deduction for the “tax imposed” by I.R.C. § 4980H.78 Additionally, 
the background section of proposed regulations for I.R.C. § 4980H states that 
the document contains “proposed Pension Excise Tax Regulations under sec-
tion 4980H.”79 Despite the fact that Congress originally used the term “tax” to 
                                                                                                                           
 68 See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222–23. 
 69 See infra notes 72–80 and accompanying text. 
 70 See infra notes 81–108 and accompanying text. 
 71 See infra notes 109–132 and accompanying text. 
 72 See I.R.C. § 4980H (2012); Lovendale & Evans, supra note 6, at 8–9. 
 73 See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(2)(D) (using the term “assessable penalties” in the section heading); id. 
§ 4980H(d)(1). 
 74 See id. § 4980H(c)(2)(D). Congress used the term “assessable payment” in this provision eve-
rywhere except the heading. See id. 
 75 See id. § 4980H(d)(1) (referring to the manner of assessment and collection under “subchapter 
B of chapter 68” of the I.R.C.). 
 76 See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 78 Fed. Reg. 218 (pro-
posed Jan. 2, 2013) (codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 54, and 301). 
 77 See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(7). 
 78 See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(7) (2012); see also Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding 
Health Coverage, 78 Fed. Reg. at 235 (“Pursuant to section 275(a)(6) regarding the nondeductibility 
of certain excise taxes . . . an assessable payment imposed under section 4980H is not deductible.”). 
 79 See Shared Responsibility for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 78 Fed. Reg. at 218. 
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refer to this exaction in prior versions of the ACA, the “assessable payment” 
label Congress used in I.R.C. § 4980H as enacted, combined with scattered 
usage of both “tax” and “penalty” terminology, makes it unclear what the exac-
tion would be considered under the OMB cost principles.80 
B. Tax vs. Penalty, Round One: The ACA’s Individual Mandate Exaction in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius 
One way to address the tax versus penalty issue in I.R.C. § 4980H—
instead of focusing on the label used by Congress—is to examine the function 
and characteristics of an assessable payment.81 In June 2012, the Supreme 
Court engaged in this type of analysis when it upheld the constitutionality of 
the ACA’s individual mandate provision, I.R.C. § 5000A, in its landmark NFIB 
decision.82 Though the Court did not address the employer mandate of the 
ACA in its opinion, it discussed whether the individual mandate’s “shared re-
sponsibility payment” was a penalty or a tax in its analysis of the ACA’s con-
                                                                                                                           
 80 See I.R.C. § 4980H; Affordable Health Care for America Act, H.R. 3962, 111th Cong. § 511 
(as passed by the House, Nov. 7, 2009) (imposing a “tax” on employers in a prior version of I.R.C. 
§ 4980H); America’s Healthy Future Act of 2009, S. 1796, 111th Cong. § 1306 (Oct. 19, 2009) 
(same); 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.441, 200.470 (2014). 
 81 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–95 (outlining the Court’s “functional approach” to determine 
whether an exaction “falls within Congress’s taxing power”). 
 82 See id. at 2593–95, 2601. See generally L. Darnell Weeden, The Supreme Court’s Treatment of 
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 12 APPALACHIAN J.L. 49 (2012) (analyzing the ACA 
and the NFIB opinion). In upholding the constitutionality of the individual mandate, the Supreme 
Court surprised many by rejecting the government’s argument that the mandate is a valid exercise of 
the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01; Tom Scocca, 
Obama Wins the Battle, Roberts Wins the War, SLATE (June 28, 2012, 11:59 AM), http://www.slate.
com/articles/news_and_politics/scocca/2012/06/roberts_health_care_opinion_commerce_clause_
the_real_reason_the_chief_justice_upheld_obamacare_.html, archived at http://perma.cc/4ZJW-EFRZ 
(discussing the various challenges to the constitutionality of the ACA and concluding that Chief Jus-
tice John G. Roberts, Jr. effectively limited Congress’s future power to regulate under the Commerce 
Clause). Indicative of the surprising nature of the Court’s ruling, some journalists erroneously report-
ed that the Court had struck down the ACA as unconstitutional under the Commerce Clause before 
reading that the Court upheld it under Congress’s Taxing Power. See Dylan Byers, Jeff Toobin Ex-
plains How CNN Got It Wrong, POLITICO (June 28, 2012, 11:28 AM), http://www.politico.com/blogs/
media/2012/06/jeff-toobin-explains-how-cnn-got-it-wrong-127564.html, archived at http://perma.cc/
3R8A-BQN6 (“It was an extraordinary turn of events because five minutes into [C]hief [J]ustice Rob-
erts’s opinion, [if] you would have asked anyone in that room whether this law was going to be held 
unconstitutional, I think we all would have said yes.”); Erik Wemple, CNN and Fox Get It Wrong on 
Health-care Ruling, WASH. POST (June 28, 2012, 10:46 AM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/
erik-wemple/post/cnn-correction-on-health-care-ruling-insane/2012/06/28/gJQAg6w78V_blog.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/V3RH-PZSR (discussing how CNN initially reported that the individual 
mandate was struck down by the Court after their correspondent learned of the Court’s rejection of the 
government’s main Commerce Clause claim). 
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stitutionality.83 The NFIB Court’s discussion of whether I.R.C. § 5000A’s 
shared responsibility payment is a penalty or a tax is helpful in analyzing how 
I.R.C. § 4980H’s assessable payment should be interpreted in light of the 
OMB’s cost principles.84 Subsection 1 discusses the NFIB Court’s analysis of 
whether the I.R.C. § 5000A shared responsibility payment was a penalty and 
whether the Anti-Injunction Act barred the suit challenging the constitutionali-
ty of the ACA.85 Subsection 2 discusses the Court’s interpretation of I.R.C. 
§ 5000A’s shared responsibility payment as a tax in light of Congress’s Taxing 
Power, despite the penalty label Congress applied to it within the ACA.86 
1. The ACA’s Individual Mandate’s “Penalty” Label Is Not Dispositive for 
the NFIB Court’s Anti-Injunction Act Analysis 
Although the ACA frequently refers to the individual mandate’s shared 
responsibility payment as a penalty, the NFIB Court concluded that, for pur-
poses of the Anti-Injunction Act, this label was not dispositive.87 The Anti-
Injunction Act, enacted in 1954, denies standing to any suit that seeks to pre-
vent the collection of taxes, but not penalties.88 In holding that, for the purpos-
es of the Anti-Injunction Act, the ACA’s individual mandate was a penalty, the 
Court gave great weight to the specific textual label Congress used to describe 
the exaction in the ACA.89 The Court noted that Congress chose to describe the 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2580–83. 
 84 See id. at 2593–98. Compare I.R.C. § 5000A (2012) (imposing an exaction on most individuals 
who fail to obtain health insurance), with id. § 4980H (2012) (imposing an exaction on most employ-
ers that fail to provide their employees with affordable health insurance).  
 85 See infra notes 87–92 and accompanying text. 
 86 See infra notes 93–108 and accompanying text. 
 87 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–84 (“Congress can, of course, describe something as a penalty 
but direct that it nonetheless be treated as a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act.”). 
 88 See I.R.C. § 7421 (2012). The practical effect of the Anti-Injunction Act is to allow taxes to be 
challenged only after they are paid and the party sues for a refund. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582; 
Enochs v. Williams Packing & Nav. Co., 370 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1962). Congress passed the Anti-Injunction 
Act to protect the government’s constant stream of tax revenue by preventing litigation aimed at ob-
structing tax collection. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582; Enochs, 370 U.S. at 7 (“The manifest purpose 
of [the Anti-Injunction Act] is to permit the United States to assess and collect taxes alleged to be due 
without judicial intervention . . . .”). Because the ACA’s individual mandate did not become enforcea-
ble until 2014, the Anti-Injunction Act would have prevented the Court from analyzing the constitu-
tionality of the individual mandate until at least then if the Court treated the mandate as a tax in this 
section of its analysis. See I.R.C. § 5000A; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–83 (stating that “[b]ecause of the 
Anti-Injunction Act, taxes can ordinarily be challenged only after they are paid, by suing for a re-
fund”). 
 89 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582–83 (“The text of the pertinent statutes suggests otherwise. . . . 
Congress’s decision to label this exaction a ‘penalty’ rather than a ‘tax’ is significant because the 
[ACA] describes many other exactions it creates as ‘taxes.’”). 
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shared responsibility payment as a penalty and not as a tax.90 The Court then 
reasoned that Congress’s decision to label the shared responsibility payment a 
penalty was intentional and significant because Congress used the term “tax” 
to describe many other exactions in the ACA.91 Thus, the Court concluded that 
the ACA does not require the shared responsibility payment to be treated as a 
tax under the Anti-Injunction Act.92 
2. Interpreting a Penalty as a Tax: The NFIB Court’s Analysis of the ACA’s 
Individual Mandate’s Constitutionality Under Congress’s Taxing Power 
In contrast, for purposes of Congress’s Taxing Power, the NFIB Court 
held that the shared responsibility payment can reasonably be interpreted as a 
tax despite its “penalty” label.93 To reach this conclusion, the Court empha-
                                                                                                                           
 90 See id. at 2583. Congress actually changed the label from “tax” to “penalty” in the final version 
of the ACA. See Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 424 (4th Cir. 2011) (Davis, J., dissenting) 
(“Congress considered earlier versions of the individual mandate that clearly characterized the exac-
tion as a tax and referred to it as such more than a dozen times. . . . Congress deliberately deleted all of 
these references to a tax in the final version of the Act and instead designated the exaction a penalty.” 
(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)), vacated by 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012); Cooter & 
Siegel, supra note 67, at 1240 (“Congress . . . [labeled] the exaction a ‘tax’ in earlier versions of the 
bill.”). 
 91 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583. In 2011, in Thomas More Law Center v. Obama, the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit noted that “[w]ords matter, and it is fair to assume that Congress 
knows the difference between a tax and a penalty.” See 651 F.3d 529, 551 (6th Cir. 2011), abrogated 
by NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012). The Sixth Circuit also noted Congress’s political motives for label-
ing the individual mandate as a “penalty” instead of a “tax.” See id. (“That is all the more true in an 
era when elected officials are not known for casually discussing, much less casually increasing, taxes. 
When was the last time a candidate for elective office promised not to raise penalties?” (internal quo-
tation marks omitted)). By one count, Congress used the term “penalty” at least seventeen times in the 
ACA’s individual mandate provision, and roughly 180 more times in the rest of the ACA. See id. 
Congress also used the term “tax” approximately 620 times throughout the ACA. See id.  
 92 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584 (citing I.R.C. § 5000A(b) (2012)). 
 93 Id. at 2593–94, 2601 (stating that Congress’s choice to label the shared responsibility payment 
as a penalty meant Congress did not want the Anti-Injunction Act to apply to the ACA, but also stat-
ing that Congress’s choice to do so did not control the Court’s analysis as to “whether an exaction is 
within Congress’s constitutional power to tax”); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. Before analyzing the 
ACA’s constitutionality under the Taxing Power, the Court first analyzed its constitutionality under 
both the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584–93 (dis-
cussing the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause precedent and con-
cluding that the ACA’s individual mandate is not authorized by either enumerated power); see U.S. 
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (describing Congress’s power “[t]o regulate Commerce”); id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 
(describing Congress’s power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying 
into Execution” its enumerated powers). The government then argued that, by failing to purchase 
health insurance, an individual “triggers a tax” and is required to make an additional payment to the 
IRS. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2593–94 (stating that the argument for the individual mandate’s constitu-
tionality was the government’s second, or alternative, argument). Taking special care to grant the 
ACA deference as a duly-passed act of Congress, the Court accepted the government’s alternative 
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sized that Congress’s choice to label the shared responsibility payment as a 
penalty was not determinative in its analysis of whether the individual mandate 
was a tax or a penalty for constitutional purposes.94 Rather, to determine 
whether the shared responsibility payment was a tax for constitutional purpos-
es, the Court noted that it must analyze the exaction’s “substance and applica-
tion.”95 The Court described this process of disregarding the label of an exac-
tion and analyzing its characteristics as its “functional approach.”96 
To reach this conclusion, the Court began by analyzing the ways that the 
shared responsibility payment functions as a tax.97 First, the Court noted that 
                                                                                                                           
argument and held that the individual mandate can reasonably be interpreted as a tax despite Congress 
labeling it a “penalty.” See id. at 2593–94, 2601 (“The Federal Government does have the power to 
impose a tax on those without health insurance.”) In its discussion of the deference a court owes a 
statute passed through the legislative process, the Court stated that “if a statute has two possible mean-
ings, one of which violates the Constitution, courts should adopt the meaning that does not do so.” See 
id. at 2593 (“No court ought, unless the terms of an act rendered it unavoidable, to give a construction 
to it which should involve a violation, however unintentional, of the [C]onstitution.” (quoting Parsons 
v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 433, 448–49 (1830))). 
 94 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct at 2594–95 (contrasting the fact that Congress’s penalty label was disposi-
tive in the Court’s Anti-Injunction Act analysis). Some judges and legal scholars fear that these con-
gressional word games allow elected representatives to escape political accountability for raising taxes 
by “call[ing] an exaction one thing in the political arena and something else in court.” Cooter & 
Siegel, supra note 67, at 1243 & n.216; see Florida ex rel. McCollum v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and 
Human Servs., 716 F. Supp. 2d 1120, 1143 (N.D. Fla. 2010) (“[N]ow that [the ACA] has passed into 
law [pursuant to Congress’s] Commerce Clause power . . . [the] government . . . argued that it was a 
tax after all . . . . [This] could have the consequence of allowing Congress to avoid [the accountability 
that operates] as a check on Congress’s broad taxing power . . . .”); Randy E. Barnett, Commandeer-
ing the People: Why the Individual Health Insurance Mandate Is Unconstitutional, 5 N.Y.U. J.L. & 
LIBERTY 581, 632 (2010) (“The public is acutely aware of tax increases. Rather than incur the politi-
cal cost of imposing a general tax on the public using its tax powers, economic mandates allow Con-
gress and the President to escape accountability for tax increases by compelling citizens to make pay-
ments directly to private companies.”). But see Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1243–44 (disagree-
ing with those scholars and saying that political accountability for federal exactions usually “turns on 
who must pay and how much they must pay, not on the exaction’s name”). 
 95 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (quoting United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 294 (1935)). 
The Court relied on its 1935 decision in United States v. Constantine for this point, in which it wres-
tled with the question of whether a $1000 exaction required for trafficking liquor after the repeal of 
the Eighteenth Amendment was a tax or a penalty. See 296 U.S. at 294. As part of its analysis, the 
Court stated that if the exaction was “in reality a penalty it cannot be converted into a tax by so nam-
ing it, and we must ascribe to it the character disclosed by its purpose and operation, regardless of 
name.” See id. (holding that the tax was in fact a penalty and beyond the limits of Congress’s Taxing 
Power to enact); see also United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S. 268, 275 (1978) (stating that the fact 
“[t]hat the funds due are referred to as a ‘penalty’ when the Government later seeks to recover them 
does not alter their essential character as taxes”); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 
(1866) (holding that the grant of certain federal licenses to sell alcohol and lottery tickets “must be 
regarded as nothing more than a mere form of imposing a tax”). 
 96 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595. 
 97 See id. at 2594. 
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the payment for failing to purchase health insurance must be paid into the U.S. 
Treasury by individuals when they file their annual federal income tax re-
turns.98 Second, the individual mandate does not apply to individuals who do 
not pay any federal income tax.99 Third, the Court stated that the amount that 
uninsured individuals must pay the IRS is affected by their taxable income, 
number of dependents, and tax filing status.100 Fourth, on a similar note, the 
ACA’s individual mandate provision is contained within the I.R.C. itself.101 
Fifth, the Court noted that the IRS is responsible for enforcing the shared re-
sponsibility payment collection process, which it must do “in the same manner 
as taxes.”102 Sixth, the Court stated that the collection process for the shared 
responsibility payments bears the essential characteristic of a tax: producing 
revenue for the government.103 
Moreover, the Court emphasized three of the shared responsibility pay-
ment’s characteristics.104 First, the Court held that the exaction did not impose 
an “exceedingly heavy burden” because the cost of the shared responsibility 
payment will likely be much less than the price of an insurance premium for an 
                                                                                                                           
 98 Id.; see I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(2) (2012) (“Any penalty imposed by this section with respect to any 
month shall be included with a taxpayer’s return under chapter 1 for the taxable year which includes 
such month.” (emphasis added)). 
 99 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (citing I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(2)). Some individuals are not required to 
pay federal income tax because their total income for the year does not meet the “filing threshold” 
contained in the I.R.C. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1) (2012) (detailing who is required to file a 
federal income tax return). An individual’s filing threshold generally can be calculated by adding the 
individual’s personal exemption amount to the standard deduction applicable to that individual. See 
I.R.C. § 6012(a)(1)(A). 
 100 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (citing I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(3), (c)(2), (c)(4)). 
 101 Id.; see I.R.C. § 5000A. 
 102 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584, 2594. 
 103 See id. at 2594 (citing United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 28 & n.4 (1953), overruled in 
part by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968)). The Court also referenced a report by the 
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that estimated that the annual revenue raised from shared respon-
sibility payments will total approximately $4 billion by 2017. See id. at 2594 (citing CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UNINSURED UNDER THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT (2010) [hereinafter 2010 CBO REPORT], available at http://www.cbo.gov/
sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/113xx/doc11379/individual_mandate_penalties-04-30.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/7MX8-ULRV). According to a February 2014 estimate by the CBO, revenue from 
shared responsibility payments between 2015 and 2024 will total $52 billion. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, 
THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2014 TO 2024, at 111 (2014) [hereinafter 2014 CBO RE-
PORT], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/45010-Outlook2014_
Feb.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/R66P-5QDZ. 
 104 See id. at 2595 (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20, 
36–37 (1922)). The Court relied on its 1922 decision in the Child Labor Tax Case for this point, in 
which it held that a statute imposing a 10% tax on employers utilizing child labor was in fact function-
ing as a penalty and thus not a valid exercise of Congress’s Taxing Power. Id. (citing Child Labor Tax 
Case, 259 U.S. at 36–37). 
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individual.105 Second, the Court noted that the ACA’s individual mandate does 
not have a “scienter requirement.”106 Third, the IRS enforces and assesses 
shared responsibility payments through normal methods of federal taxation.107 
Thus, the Court concluded that the shared responsibility payment’s “practical 
characteristics” support its conclusion that the exaction could reasonably be 
interpreted as a tax despite its congressional label as a penalty.108 
C. Further Effects-Based Analysis of the Tax vs. Penalty Dichotomy 
Because the NFIB Court was dealing with a constitutional question and 
not a purely interpretive one, its functional approach is not dispositive in the 
determination of whether I.R.C. § 4980H’s assessable payment is a tax or a 
penalty in light of the OMB’s federal award cost principles.109 As such, addi-
                                                                                                                           
 105 Id. at 2595–96 & n.8 (analyzing figures provided in a report to Congress estimating that, in 
2016, individuals making $100,000 annually would likely owe about $200 monthly in shared respon-
sibility payments if they choose not to purchase insurance, whereas an insurance premium for a quali-
fying plan is estimated to be roughly $400 monthly). The Court even stated that, because the amount 
of the shared responsibility payment was so low when compared to the estimated cost of an individu-
al’s insurance premium, failing to purchase insurance and making the requisite shared responsibility 
payment could be a “reasonable financial decision.” Id. at 2596. 
 106 Id. at 2595; see Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 37 (“[I]t is only where [an employer] 
knowingly departs from the prescribed course that payment is to be exacted.”). Scienter requirements 
are usually associated with punitive statutes because legislative bodies often only want to punish indi-
viduals who choose to break the law. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595; see Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 
37 (“Scienters are associated with penalties, not with taxes.”). 
 107 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595. The Court also emphasized that the IRS is prohibited by the 
ACA from subjecting taxpayers who fail to make their shared responsibility payments on time “to any 
criminal prosecution or [additional] penalty with respect to such failure.” Id. at 2596; see I.R.C. 
§ 5000A(g)(2) (2012). In the Child Labor Tax Case, however, the tax was enforceable by the Depart-
ment of Labor, which is typically responsible for labor law violations, rather than the IRS, which is 
responsible for tax revenue collection. See 259 U.S. at 37. This fact bolstered the Court’s conclusion 
that the exaction in the Child Labor Tax Case was a penalty and not a tax. See id. at 37–38. 
 108 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2600–01 (stating that the shared responsibility payment “pass[es] 
muster as a tax under [the Court’s] narrowest interpretations of the taxing power”). 
 109 See id. at 2595 (noting that “the shared responsibility payment may for constitutional purposes 
be considered a tax, not a penalty” (emphasis added)); 2 C.F.R. §§ 200.441, 200.470 (2014) (allowing 
federal awards to be used for taxes, but not for fines and penalties). The three characteristics articulat-
ed by the NFIB Court are similar to three characteristics articulated by two legal scholars to distin-
guish taxes from penalties when not confronted with a constitutional challenge. See Cooter & Siegel, 
supra note 67, at 1229–30. Under the theory of these scholars, the constitutional test for distinguishing 
taxes and penalties should focus on the exaction’s effect on the conduct of the people governed by the 
law. See id. at 1229 & n.163. In other words, the test is “whether [the exaction] dampens or prevents 
conduct.” See id. at 1230 (stating that exactions that dampen conduct raise significant revenues and 
exactions that prevent conduct do not raise such revenues). Alternatively, these scholars have formu-
lated three useful questions to ask about the “material characteristics of an exaction” in order to de-
termine—when not confronted with constitutional issues—whether a particular exaction is a penalty 
or a tax. See id. First, one must ask: “[i]s the amount of the exaction so high that it exceeds the ex-
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tional analysis of the material characteristics of an exaction is prudent to de-
termine whether the assessable payment is a tax or a penalty.110 These material 
characteristics include the language used by a legislative body in describing 
the exaction, the exaction’s magnitude, and the exaction’s conditions.111 
One way to distinguish a penalty from a tax is the language that a legisla-
tive body uses to describe the exaction and the relevant conduct it seeks to 
regulate.112 The specific language that a legislative body uses expresses a value 
judgment about the conduct it sought to influence.113 Penalties are exactions 
imposed as a means of punishment “for an unlawful act or omission.”114 In 
contrast, the language describing taxed conduct does not forbid or condemn 
the conduct as the language describing penalized conduct does.115 Rather, the 
                                                                                                                           
pected benefit from engaging in the assessed conduct for almost everyone?” Id. This first question 
closely aligns with the first characteristic analyzed by the NFIB Court: whether the tax imposes an 
“exceedingly heavy burden.” See 132 S. Ct. at 2595. Second, one must ask: “[d]oes the exaction’s 
amount depend on whether the assessed individual has a certain mental state, especially the intention 
to perform the assessed conduct?” Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1230. This second question 
speaks to the same idea as the NFIB Court’s second characteristic: the scienter requirement. See 132 
S. Ct. at 2595. Third, one must ask: “[d]oes the amount of the exaction increase with repetition of the 
assessed conduct?” See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1230. This third inquiry is where the schol-
ars’ three criteria differ from the NFIB Court’s. Compare NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96 (focusing on 
who collects the exaction as the third prong of its functional analysis), with Cooter & Siegel, supra 
note 67, at 1230 (focusing on whether an exaction’s amount increases with repetition of the conduct). 
Answering “yes” to each of the scholars’ three questions means the exaction probably seeks to prevent 
conduct and is thus a penalty. See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1231. Conversely, answering 
“no” to each question means the exaction probably just dampens behavior and raises money for the 
government, so the exaction is a tax. See id. The scholars’ three criteria correctly predicted the result 
in NFIB, and may also be used to characterize I.R.C. § 4980H’s assessable payment as a tax or a pen-
alty. See id. at 1231, 1241 (stating that “[t]he alignment of these material characteristics can decide 
many cases, including the ACA’s minimum insurance requirement”). 
 110 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596–2601 (further analyzing the tax versus penalty issue with respect 
to the individual mandate); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222–23 (discussing a variety of ways 
to distinguish taxes from penalties).  
 111 See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222–23 (“Regulations backed by penalties and taxes 
often have distinct characteristics.”). 
 112 Id. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596 (quoting United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of 
Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224 (1996)); United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931) (“A ‘tax’ 
is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government; a ‘penalty,’ as the word is here 
used, is an exaction imposed by statute as punishment for an unlawful act.”). Some examples of con-
demning language used in penalties include: “wrong,” “penalty,” “punishment,” or “ought not to.” See 
Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222 (giving criminal fines, regulatory fines, and punitive damages 
awarded in some civil lawsuits as examples of penalties). 
 115 See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222. Some examples of language used in taxes are 
“permitted,” “allowed,” or “neither required nor forbidden.” See id.  
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law explicitly permits individuals to engage in the taxed conduct as long as 
they pay the tax.116 
In NFIB, the Court stated that the ACA’s individual mandate provision, 
I.R.C. § 5000A, did not punish unlawful conduct.117 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that the ACA’s mandate that 
individuals “shall” buy health insurance or pay a “penalty” required a finding 
that I.R.C. § 5000A punished unlawful conduct.118 Rather, the Court reasoned 
that I.R.C. § 5000A was enacted for the purpose of inducing uninsured indi-
viduals to purchase health insurance.119 The Court noted that neither the ACA, 
nor any other statute, attached any negative legal consequences on the failure 
to purchase health insurance beyond requiring the individual to make a pay-
ment to the IRS.120 Thus, the Court reasoned that the ACA’s shared responsibil-
ity payment merely imposes a tax that an individual may lawfully decide to 
pay in lieu of purchasing health insurance.121 
In addition to the language a legislative body uses in enacting an exac-
tion, the exaction’s “magnitude and conditions” may also be used to interpret 
                                                                                                                           
 116 See id. For example, the federal income tax provisions of the I.R.C. do not condemn earning 
income; they simply require payment of a certain percentage to the IRS. See I.R.C. § 1 (2012 & Supp. I 
2013); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222. Other examples of taxes on lawful conduct include “tar-
iffs, excises, head taxes, and property taxes.” Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1223 & n.146. Addition-
ally, individuals often infer permission to engage in the conduct described in the statute in the absence of 
an express prohibition of that conduct. See id. at 1222. 
 117 See 132 S. Ct. at 2597. 
 118 See id. (citing New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992)). The statute that the 
Court considered in its 1992 decision in New York v. United States stated that “[e]ach State shall be 
responsible for providing . . . for the disposal of . . . low-level radioactive waste.” 505 U.S. at 169 
(quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2021c(a)(1)(A) (2006)). The Court interpreted the relevant statute to impose a 
“series of incentives” for each state to take responsibility for its own radioactive waste. See id. at 170, 
173–74 (discussing the statute’s two sets of incentives that Congress granted to the states: (1) condi-
tioning grants on the state’s achievement of certain “milestones;” and (2) authorizing cost increases 
for disposal site use, followed by denial of access to the sites, to states that do not meet the prescribed 
federal requirements). 
 119 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597. 
 120 See id. (stating that the government agreed with the Court’s conclusion in its brief, noting that 
if individuals chose to make a shared responsibility payment rather than buy health insurance, “they 
have fully complied with the law”). 
 121 See id. The NFIB Court noted that, in 2010, the CBO estimated that roughly four million indi-
viduals would decide to pay the shared responsibility payment instead of buying health insurance. See 
id. (citing 2010 CBO REPORT, supra note 103). On September 19, 2012, however, the CBO issued a 
report which significantly increased its estimate of how many people will pay the penalty in lieu of 
purchasing health insurance. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, PAYMENTS OF PENALTIES FOR BEING UN-
INSURED UNDER THE AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 1–3 (2012), available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/
default/files/cbofiles/attachments/09-19-12-Indiv_Mandate_Penalty.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/
U8ZN-QF2W. Together with the Joint Committee on Taxation, the CBO estimated that in 2016 just 
under six million people will choose to pay a penalty because they do not have health insurance, an 
increase of 50% from the CBO’s prior estimate. See id. at 1. 
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whether it is a penalty or a tax.122 Penalty amounts are usually high in relation 
to the gain an individual might receive from engaging in the prohibited con-
duct.123 As a result, a rational, self-interested individual will typically choose 
not to engage in the prohibited conduct.124 Because an individual acting irra-
tionally may continue engaging in the prohibited conduct despite the requisite 
exaction, a penalty’s magnitude sometimes increases for intentional or multiple 
offenses.125 Conversely, tax amounts are usually low in relation to the gain an 
individual derives from engaging in the taxed conduct.126 Similarly, a tax rate 
does not progressively increase for an individual who intentionally or repeat-
edly engages in the taxed conduct.127 
Viewed in this light, both the magnitude and conditions of I.R.C. § 5000A 
support the NFIB Court’s conclusion that the exaction was a tax and not a pen-
alty.128 The amount of a shared responsibility payment is not overly burden-
some on individuals when compared to the cost of their health insurance pre-
miums.129 Additionally, the amount of an individual’s shared responsibility 
payment does not increase for multiple offenses.130 Congress even granted in-
dividuals an exemption from their shared responsibility payments during short 
periods of up to three months where they are uninsured.131 Thus, the expressive 
                                                                                                                           
 122 See Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222. 
 123 See id. 
 124 See id. at 1222 & n.145.  
 125 See id. at 1222 (“Thus an unintentional tort may trigger liability for actual harm, whereas 
doing the same act intentionally may trigger punitive damages.”). 
 126 See id. at 1223. 
 127 See id. at 1223 & n.147 (“Earning income intentionally does not affect the income tax rate, 
and the income tax rate does not change just because someone earns income year after year.”) 
 128 See I.R.C. § 5000A(c) (2012); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2601. 
 129 See I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(A) (stating that the “applicable dollar amount,” the total yearly pay-
ment for not having health insurance, is $695, which is roughly $58 per month); supra note 105 and 
accompanying text (comparing estimated shared responsibility payments of approximately $200 per 
month for individuals making over $100,000 annually to an estimated health insurance premium cost 
of $400 per month in 2016). Congress set the “applicable dollar amount” at $695, but this amount 
does not apply until 2016. See I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(B). Rather, Congress saw fit to ease people into 
the ACA’s individual mandate and thus capped the yearly payment amount to $95 per individual in 
2014 and $325 per individual in 2015. See id. 
 130 See id. § 5000A(c); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1242–43 (noting that the amount of 
each shared responsibility payment under I.R.C. § 5000A does not progressively increase if an indi-
vidual does not purchase health insurance year after year). Rather, any increases in shared responsibil-
ity payment amounts come from the phase-in provisions of the ACA (effective until 2016) or from 
cost-of-living adjustments in calendar years after 2016. See I.R.C. § 5000A(c)(3)(B), (D) (specifying 
that the cost-of-living adjustment shall be determined by multiplying $695 by the Consumer Price 
Index). 
 131 See I.R.C. § 5000A(e)(4) (stating that if an individual has more than one of these three-month 
coverage gaps in a given calendar year, the exemption applies only to the months in the first exemp-
tion period). 
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language, magnitude, and conditions of the ACA’s shared responsibility pay-
ment all support the NFIB Court’s conclusion that I.R.C. § 5000A can reasona-
bly be interpreted as a tax despite its “penalty” label.132 
IV. SECTION 4980H’S ASSESSABLE PAYMENT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED A 
TAX FOR FEDERAL AWARD COST PRINCIPLES 
Using the methods for distinguishing taxes from penalties articulated both 
by the Supreme Court in its 2012 decision in National Federation of Inde-
pendent Business v. Sebelius (NFIB) and by legal scholars, the assessable pay-
ment imposed by I.R.C. § 4980H should be considered a tax, not a penalty, 
under the OMB’s federal award cost principles.133 Like the shared responsibil-
ity payment that the Court wrestled with in NFIB, I.R.C. § 4980H’s assessable 
payment, despite its ambiguous label, bears many similarities to a tax.134 Un-
der the NFIB Court’s functional approach for distinguishing taxes from penal-
ties for constitutional purposes, an assessable payment should be considered a 
tax.135 Additionally, the material characteristics of an assessable payment sup-
port the conclusion that it should be considered a tax.136 
Section A examines the ways in which an assessable payment looks like a 
tax.137 Section B then applies the NFIB Court’s functional approach to con-
clude that an assessable payment should be considered a tax.138 Section C 
reaches the same conclusion by analyzing an assessable payment’s material 
characteristics.139 
                                                                                                                           
 132 See id.; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–97, 2601; Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1247 (conclud-
ing that because I.R.C. § 5000A is predicted to “dampen uninsured behavior, not to prevent it, it is a 
tax equivalent for purposes of Congress’s tax power”); supra notes 81–131 and accompanying text. 
 133 I.R.C. § 4980H (2012); Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius (NFIB), 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2594–
97 (2012); 2 C.F.R. § 200.470 (2014); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1241–43; infra notes 134–
171 and accompanying text (applying the tests to distinguish taxes from penalties set forth by both the 
Supreme Court and legal scholars and concluding that the assessable payment should be considered a 
tax). 
 134 See I.R.C. § 4980H; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594; infra notes 140–147 and accompanying text. 
 135 See I.R.C. § 4980H; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594–96; Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1248–
52; infra notes 148–160 and accompanying text.  
 136 See I.R.C. § 4980H; Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1241–47; infra notes 161–171 and 
accompanying text. 
 137 See infra notes 140–147 and accompanying text. 
 138 See infra notes 148–160 and accompanying text. 
 139 See infra notes 161–171 and accompanying text. 
2014] Assessable Payments and Federal Award Cost Principles 973 
A. If It Looks Like a Tax, Swims Like a Tax, and Quacks Like a Tax,  
Then It Probably Is a Tax 
An assessable payment imposed by I.R.C. § 4980H, like the ACA’s indi-
vidual mandate exaction the NFIB Court examined, “looks like a tax in many 
respects.”140 First, large employers that fail to provide affordable health insur-
ance to their employees must pay their assessable payments into the U.S. 
Treasury just as they pay their other taxes.141 Second, I.R.C. § 4980H is locat-
ed in the I.R.C.142 Third, the IRS performs its assessment and collection of as-
sessable payments “in the same manner as taxes.”143 Fourth, the collection 
process for assessable payments will produce significant revenue for the gov-
ernment when I.R.C. § 4980H becomes effective.144 
                                                                                                                           
 140 See I.R.C. § 4980H (2012); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 141 See I.R.C. § 4980H(d) (discussing payment “upon notice and demand by the Secretary” and 
the Secretary’s discretion to provide for payment on an “annual, monthly, or other periodic basis”); 
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594–95 (discussing how individuals pay their shared responsibility payments into 
the U.S. Treasury “when they file their tax returns”). 
 142 I.R.C. § 4980H; see NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 143 I.R.C. § 6671(a) (2012); see id. § 4980H(d)(1) (stating—in almost identical language to I.R.C. 
§ 5000A(g)(1) relating to assessment and collection of the ACA’s individual mandate exaction—that an 
“assessable payment . . . shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty 
under subchapter B of chapter 68,” which includes I.R.C. § 6671). The IRS has issued some guidance to 
employers about the assessable payment collections process. See Shared Responsibility for Employers 
Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. 8544, 8566 (Feb. 12, 2014) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pts. 1, 
54, and 301); Questions and Answers on Employer Shared Responsibility Provisions Under the Afforda-
ble Care Act, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. (last updated Feb. 27, 2014) [hereinafter IRS Q&A], http://
www.irs.gov/uac/Newsroom/Questions-and-Answers-on-Employer-Shared-Responsibility-Provisions-
Under-the-Affordable-Care-Act, archived at http://perma.cc/4EZG-VFS6. The IRS has stated that it will 
contact employers to let them know of their “potential liability” and give them an opportunity to respond 
before officially assessing liability and sending notice and demand for payment. See Shared Responsibil-
ity for Employers Regarding Health Coverage, 79 Fed. Reg. at 8566; IRS Q&A, supra. The IRS notice 
will tell employers how to make their assessable payments, but, unlike an individual making a shared 
responsibility payment, employers will not include their assessable payments in their tax returns. Com-
pare I.R.C. § 5000A(b)(2) (2012) (“Any penalty imposed by this section . . . shall be included with a 
taxpayer’s return . . . for the taxable year . . . .”), with IRS Q&A, supra (“Employers will not be required 
to include the [assessable] payment on any tax return that they file.”). 
 144 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594 (analyzing CBO estimates for government revenues from the 
ACA’s individual mandate exaction); 2014 CBO REPORT, supra note 103, at 111 (estimating that 
revenues from employers’ assessable payments between 2015 and 2024 will total $151 billion); 
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, CBO’S FEBRUARY 2013 ESTIMATE OF THE EFFECTS OF THE AFFORDABLE 
CARE ACT ON HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE 2 (2013) [hereinafter 2013 CBO ESTIMATE], available 
at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/43900-2013-02-ACA.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/L9PK-GJQ8 (estimating, as of February 2013, that the projected revenue from em-
ployers’ assessable payments between 2013 and 2023 will total $150 billion).  
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Additionally, Congress explicitly labeled the assessable payment a “tax” 
once in I.R.C. § 4980H.145 This single usage of the “tax” label in I.R.C. § 4980H 
is significant when compared to Congress’s conscious choice to eliminate all 
references to the ACA’s individual mandate exaction as a tax in I.R.C. 
§ 5000A.146 Congress’s use of the “tax” label, combined with its decision to as-
sess and collect assessable payments in the same manner as taxes, supports the 
conclusion that an assessable payment should be considered a tax under the 
OMB’s federal award cost principles.147 
B. Section 4980H’s Assessable Payment Is a Tax Under the NFIB Court’s 
Three-Pronged Functional Approach 
The NFIB Court utilized its three-pronged functional approach to deter-
mine that the ACA’s individual mandate exaction may be considered a tax for 
constitutional purposes.148 Though not directly analogous, applying the same 
functional approach to I.R.C. § 4980H’s assessable payment compels a similar 
conclusion that it should be viewed as a tax under the OMB’s federal award 
cost principles.149 An assessable payment meets the first prong of the NFIB test 
because it does not impose an overly heavy burden on employers that do not 
offer affordable health insurance to their employees.150 Pursuant to I.R.C. 
§ 4980H, employers face a maximum annual liability per employee of either 
$2000 (if they do not offer health insurance) or $3000 (if the health insurance 
they offer is unaffordable).151 This maximum annual liability under I.R.C. 
§ 4980H pales in comparison to an employer’s current cost of providing health 
                                                                                                                           
 145 See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(7) (discussing the nondeductibility of the “tax imposed” by I.R.C. 
§ 4980H); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583 (emphasizing the significance of Congress’s decision not to label 
the ACA’s individual mandate exaction as a “tax” because of other provisions in the ACA, like I.R.C. 
§ 4980H, where Congress used the “tax” label). 
 146 See I.R.C. § 4980H(c)(7) (2012); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2583; Liberty Univ. v. Geithner, 671 
F.3d 391, 424 (4th Cir. 2011) (Davis, J., dissenting) (discussing the changing congressional labels of 
ACA exactions), vacated by 133 S. Ct. 679 (2012); supra notes 29–32 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing prior versions of I.R.C. § 4980H in which Congress explicitly labeled the ACA’s employer 
mandate exaction a “tax”). 
 147 See I.R.C. §§ 4980H, 6671; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2594; 2 C.F.R. § 200.470 (2014). 
 148 See 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96; supra notes 104–108 and accompanying text (describing the NFIB 
Court’s three-pronged functional approach). 
 149 See I.R.C. § 4980H; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96. 
 150 See I.R.C. § 4980H(a), (b), (c)(1); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595 (examining whether an exaction 
imposes an “exceedingly heavy burden”). 
 151 See I.R.C. § 4980H (indexing to inflation future caps on total annual assessable payment 
amounts per employee); supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (comparing an employer’s maxi-
mum annual assessable payment with the average annual cost of its share of employee health insur-
ance premiums). 
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insurance to its employees.152 Putting aside considerations of employee morale 
and recruiting, it is likely a “reasonable financial decision” for employers to 
make assessable payments instead of providing affordable health insurance to 
their employees.153 Thus, an assessable payment’s burden on large employers 
is not exceedingly high and satisfies the first prong of the NFIB test.154 
An assessable payment also meets the second prong of the NFIB test be-
cause I.R.C. § 4980H does not contain a scienter requirement.155 Regardless of 
whether an employer makes a conscious decision to not comply with I.R.C. 
§ 4980H’s requirements, or simply neglects to, an assessable payment is “im-
posed” on them.156 Because I.R.C. § 4980H’s imposition of an assessable 
payment does not hinge on the intentionality of an employer’s choice to not 
provide affordable health insurance, an assessable payment is more like a tax 
than a penalty.157 
Finally, an assessable payment satisfies the third prong of the NFIB test 
because the IRS is responsible for assessing and collecting these exactions.158 
Though employers will not be required to include their assessable payments on 
their federal tax returns, the IRS nonetheless assesses and collects them.159 
Thus, an assessable payment imposed by I.R.C. § 4980H satisfies the NFIB 
Court’s three-pronged, functional approach, and, therefore, can reasonably be 
considered a tax for federal award cost allowance purposes.160 
                                                                                                                           
 152 See BRANSCOME, supra note 47, at 1, 3 (stating that the average annual, per-employee cost of 
providing health insurance is roughly $4000 for individual plans and $11,000 for family plans). 
 153 See I.R.C. § 4980H(a), (b) (2012); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596 (comparing the amount of an 
individual’s shared responsibility payment with the price of health insurance); see also Tully, supra 
note 46 (discussing AT&T’s disclosure that it spends $2.4 billion per year on health coverage for 
employees and could reduce that number to $600 million if it simply made assessable payments in-
stead). 
 154 See I.R.C. § 4980H; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96 (emphasizing that the cost of the ACA’s 
individual mandate exaction is relatively low and can never be more than the price of health insur-
ance). 
 155 See I.R.C. § 4980H; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596; Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1242 (em-
phasizing the lack of a “mens rea requirement” in the ACA’s individual mandate and stating it does 
not matter whether declining to obtain health insurance was innocent or intentional). 
 156 See I.R.C. § 4980H(a), (b). 
 157 See id. § 4980H; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596–96 (noting that “scienter requirements are typical 
of punitive statutes” because Congress often desires to punish only intentional violators of the law). 
 158 See I.R.C. § 4980H(d)(1); NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2595–96. 
 159 IRS Q&A, supra note 143 (stating that, after employees’ tax returns have been filed, the IRS 
will provide notice and demand for payment should the employer owe an assessable payment under 
I.R.C. § 4980H rather than having employers include assessable payments on their tax returns). 
 160 See I.R.C. § 4980H (2012) (imposing an assessable payment, collected by the IRS, on em-
ployers that do not provide affordable health insurance to their employees regardless of their intent); 
NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596 (emphasizing that an exaction imposed by the ACA may “be viewed as a 
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C. Section 4980H’s Assessable Payment Is a Tax in Light  
of Additional Effects-Based Analysis 
Additionally, the material characteristics of an assessable payment—its 
language, magnitude, and conditions—support the conclusion that the exaction 
may reasonably be considered a tax.161 First, Congress used language in I.R.C. 
§ 4980H that does not impose a punishment on employers that do not offer 
affordable health insurance to their employees.162 With the ACA’s employer 
mandate, as with its individual mandate, Congress’s main policy objective was 
to “induce the purchase of health insurance.”163 Similar to the ACA’s individu-
al mandate provision, I.R.C. § 4980H states that if a large employer “fails to 
offer” affordable coverage, then an assessable payment is imposed on it.164 
Section 4980H does not impose any other negative legal consequences on em-
ployers that do not offer affordable health insurance to their employees.165 Ad-
ditionally, the Congressional Budget Office estimates that the number of peo-
ple covered by employer-provided health insurance will fall by roughly two 
million in 2015 and six million in 2016.166 Because of those figures and the 
lack of punishment in I.R.C. § 4980H, it is doubtful that Congress enacted 
I.R.C. § 4980H thinking it was making an employer’s business decision to not 
offer affordable insurance unlawful.167 Therefore, an employer that makes that 
                                                                                                                           
tax” despite not being labeled a tax by Congress); 2 C.F.R. § 200.470 (2014) (allowing federal awards 
to be used for taxes). 
 161 See I.R.C. § 4980H; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596–97 (stating that Congress’s choice of label for 
an exaction is not controlling when determining whether that exaction is considered a tax or a penal-
ty); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222–23 (discussing the differences in the “material character-
istics” of taxes and penalties). 
 162 See I.R.C. § 4980H(a), (b). 
 163 NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2596–97 (stating that the inducement of individuals to purchase health 
insurance was a clear aim of the ACA’s individual mandate); see I.R.C. § 4980H(a), (b) (requiring 
employees to make assessable payments if they do not provide affordable health insurance to their 
employees); 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2)(D) (Supp. IV 2010) (stating that Congress sought to achieve its 
goal of ensuring “near-universal [health] coverage by building upon and strengthening the private 
employer-based health insurance system”). 
 164 Compare I.R.C. § 4980H(a), (b) (imposing an assessable payment on applicable large employ-
ers that “fail to offer” affordable health insurance to their employees), with I.R.C. § 5000A(a), (b)(1) 
(2012) (stating that individuals “shall” purchase health insurance or else there is a “penalty” imposed 
on them). 
 165 See I.R.C. § 4980H. 
 166 See 2014 CBO REPORT, supra note 103, at 108; 2013 CBO ESTIMATE, supra note 144, at 1. 
 167 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2597; Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222 (stating that a law im-
posing an exaction should be interpreted as imposing a tax when it “explicitly permits the taxed con-
duct as long as one pays the tax”). 
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business judgment is still acting within the bounds of the law as long as it 
makes an assessable payment to the IRS.168 
Moreover, in addition to not imposing a punishment like a penalty would, 
I.R.C. § 4980H does not impose an excessive financial burden on employers, 
and the amount employers owe to the IRS does not increase for their continued 
failure to provide affordable health insurance.169 Rather, the only increase in fu-
ture assessable payment amounts will occur because they are indexed for infla-
tion.170 Thus, the expressive language, magnitude, and conditions of an assessa-
ble payment imposed by I.R.C. § 4980H all support the conclusion that the exac-
tion is a tax that employers may lawfully decide to pay in lieu of offering afford-
able health insurance to their employees.171 
CONCLUSION 
Congress enacted I.R.C. § 4980H, the ACA’s employer mandate provi-
sion, explicitly to strengthen the private employer-provided health insurance 
market in order to achieve its goal of near-universal health coverage. To ac-
complish this objective, Congress imposed an exaction on large employers that 
fail to offer affordable health insurance to their employees. Although Con-
gress’s stated objectives for I.R.C. § 4980H may be desirable, the specific ter-
minology it used to describe the exaction leaves much to be desired. By chang-
ing the label of I.R.C. § 4980H’s exaction from “tax” to “assessable payment” 
during the ACA’s revision process, Congress created an ambiguity that now 
squarely confronts nonprofits and other nonfederal entities receiving federal 
awards: is the exaction a tax or a penalty? 
Section 4980H’s assessable payment should be considered a tax for the 
purpose of determining federal award cost allowances. Despite Congress’s ef-
forts to relabel the exaction, there remains one instance in I.R.C. § 4980H 
where it still refers to the exaction as a “tax.” Moreover, I.R.C. § 4980H meets 
the test articulated by the Supreme Court in National Federation of Independ-
ent Business v. Sebelius and functions equivalently to a tax: it is cheaper for an 
                                                                                                                           
 168 See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2596–97 (discussing the government’s position that if an individual 
chooses not to purchase health insurance and pays the requisite ACA exaction instead, they have 
complied with the law); Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1247 & n.230 (same).  
 169 See I.R.C. § 4980H(a), (b), (c)(1) (2012). 
 170 See id. § 4980H(c)(5) (stating each dollar amount discussed earlier in the provision shall be 
increased by multiplying that dollar amount by a “premium adjustment percentage” in subsequent 
years). 
 171 See id. § 4980H; NFIB, 132 S. Ct. 2596–2601; cf. Cooter & Siegel, supra note 67, at 1222–23, 
1253 (“The exaction for noninsurance in the [ACA] has the expressive characteristics of a penalty, the 
material characteristics of a tax, and almost certainly will have the effect of a tax. . . . In these circum-
stances, the exaction’s name should make no difference . . . .”). 
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employer to make an assessable payment than to provide affordable health in-
surance, there is no scienter requirement, and the IRS is responsible for its en-
forcement. Congress did not intend I.R.C. § 4980H to legally punish an em-
ployer’s failure to offer affordable health coverage, nor did it increase the 
amount an employer owes for repeated noncompliance. Rather, Congress 
sought to shape employer conduct by incentivizing them to offer affordable 
health insurance. Thus, both the functionality and characteristics of assessable 
payments are consistent with those of taxes—not penalties. Considering an 
assessable payment imposed by I.R.C. § 4980H to be a tax has an additional 
benefit: it prevents Congress from playing legislative word games in order to 
escape political accountability for raising taxes. 
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